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Abstract
The developed world stands at the fore of a phenomenal demographic transition. Over the next
30 years the number of elderly in the OECD countries will more than double. At the same time,
the number of workers available to pay the elderly their government-guaranteed pension and health
care beneﬁts will rise by less than 10 percent. These two demographic trends are expected to put
enormous pressure on social security systems and government expenses. To address the consequences
of the aging process, this paper develops a dynamic, intergenerational, and interregional demographic
life-cycle model. The model has three regions - the U.S., the EU and Japan - which exchange goods and
capital. The model features immigration, age-speciﬁc fertility, life span extension, life span uncertainty,
bequests arising from incomplete annuitization, and intra-cohort heterogeneity. After introducing the
theoretical model, we simulate the transition path for the three considered regions keeping current
immigration constant, assuming the projected increase in life expectancy and the continuation of
current social security and health care policies.
JEL classiﬁcation: H0
Keywords: Demographic transition, overlapping generations (OLG), computable general equilibrium
models (CGE)
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Indices
t,i,z index for years during the transition
a,j,u,m index for age of individuals
s index for parents age at time of birth
k index for income class
x region index which is usually omitted
(i.e. N(a,i,s) should be N(a,i,s,x) etc.)
W index for world
Population
N(a,i,s,k) number of agents of age a in year i whose parents were age s when
they were born and who belong to income class k (in region x)
ˆ N(a,i,k) total number of agents of age a in year i who belong to income class k
N(a,i) total number of agents of age a in year i
NM(a,i,k) number of newly arrived net-immigrants of age a in year i in
income class k
NM(a,i) number of newly arrived net-immigrants of age a in year i
Υ(k) share of income class k in population
Pop(i) total population in year i
KID(a,i,k) number of children of a household who is a years old in year i and
who belongs to income class k
¯ d(a,i),d(a,i) unconditional and conditional death probabilities
P(a,i) survival probability
f(a,i) fertility rate
TFR(i) total fertility rate in year i
ABA(i) average birth age in year i
LE(i) life expectancy in year i
n(i), ¯ n endogenous and exogenous population growth rate
Household sector
U(j,t,s,k) utility function of agent age j in year t whose parents were age s at birth
and who belongs to income class k (in region x)
V (j,t,s,k) utility of agent derived from his own consumption
H(j,t,s,k) utility of agent derived from the consumption of his children
c(a,i,s,k) consumption of goods of agent
cK(a,i,s,k) consumption per child of agent
`(a,i,s,k) leisure consumption of agent
W(a,i,s,k) gross labor income of agent
a(a,i,s,k) assets of agent
I(a,i,s,k) inheritance of agent
2T(a,i,s,k) net tax payments of agent
θ pure rate of time preference
γ intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ρ intratemporal elasticity of substitution
α leisure preference parameter
h(a,i) time endowment at age a in year i
E(a,k) human capital proﬁle of a native at age a in income class k
λ rate of technological growth
ξ(k) productivity index for income class k
Production sector
F(·) production function for gross output
FK(i) marginal product of capital in year i
FL(i) marginal product of labor in year i
Φ(·) adjustment cost function
ΦK(i) marginal adjustment cost due to the capital stock in year i
Φ∆K(i) marginal adjustment cost due to investment in year i
φ technology parameter
ε capital share in production
σ elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
ψ adjustment cost coeﬃcient
δ rate of economic depreciation
Government sector
τw(a,i,s,k), marginal and average (individual) wage tax rate in year i
¯ τw(a,i,s,k)
τc(i),τr(i),τk(i), consumption, capital, corporate and inheritance tax rate in year i
τb(i)
τp(a,i,s,k), marginal and average (individual) payroll tax rate in year i
¯ τp(a,i,s,k)
τh(a,i,s,k) marginal and average (individual) health care contributions in year i
¯ τh(a,i,s,k)
τd(a,i,s,k) marginal and average (individual) diability insurance contributions
¯ τd(a,i,s,k) in year i
ˆ τp(i), ˆ τh(i), ˆ τd(i) aggregate pension, health care and disability insurance contribution
rate in period i
T k(i) corporate tax revenues
G(i),g total and per person public consumption in year i
B(i),b(i) stock of public debt and in relation to GDP in year i
∆B(i) government deﬁcit in year i
Pen(a,i,s,k) individual pension beneﬁt
PB(i) aggregate pension beneﬁts in year i
HB(i) aggregate health transfers in year i
3DB(i) aggregate disability transfers in year i
PY (i) aggregate base for social security contributions
µ1(i) fraction of pension outlays ﬁnanced by general taxes
µ2(i) fraction of health costs ﬁnanced by general taxes
χ( ¯ W(z,s,k)) (individual) replacement rate as a function of indexed lifetime income ¯ W
¯ a(i) retirement age set by government in year i
ˆ W(i) average labor earnings in year i
Θ contribution ceiling
hc(a) age-speciﬁc proﬁle of health costs
di equal disability transfer
edu(a) age-speciﬁc proﬁle of education costs for children
β0,β1 parameter for wage tax function
ω0,ω1 parameter for replacement rate function
Prices
w(i) gross wage rate in year i
r(i) interest rate in year i
q(i) shadow price of capital in year i
R(i,t) gross compound interest rate
Aggregate variables
Y (i) ﬁrm marketable output in year i
L(i) aggregate labor supply in year i
K(i) capital stock in year i
∆K(i) investment outlays in year i
A(i) aggregate savings in year i
A(i) aggregate assets existing at the beginning of year i
¯ A(a,i,k) aggregate savings of age a agents of income class k in year i
ˆ A(i) aggregate savings of new immigrants in period i
S(x) share of region x in the world assets
C(i) aggregate consumption in year i
TB(i) trade balance in year i
Bf(i) stock of net foreign bonds in year i
∆Bf(i) current account surplus in year i
DIV (i) dividend payments at the end of year i
V (i) value of the ﬁrm in period i
4I. Introduction
The present paper aims to describe in detail the population projections and the theoretical
structure of a new simulation model which is applied to analyze the economic impact of the
demographic transition in the OECD.
Our project intends to provide an aggregated picture as well as detailed ﬁgures for selected
regions. Consequently, our approach is twofold. In order to analyze the consequences of pop-
ulation aging on worldwide capital markets we develop a multi-region model consisting of the
EU-15 region, the USA and Japan. In each region/country we model the population dynam-
ics in a similar way. Although we account for immigration, natives and immigrants are not
distinguished within each cohort. Immigrants arrive at diﬀerent ages, but they arrive with
identical asset endowments and preferences as the respective natives. Consequently, they be-
have like natives after arrival. Within each cohort we disaggregate three income classes similar
as Fehr (2000), Beetsma et al. (2001) or Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001). Consequently we are able to
take into account diﬀerences in the progressivity of national social security and tax systems.
Such a set-up allows us to analyze issues of intra-generational as well as inter-generational and
inter-national redistribution.
The next section discusses the data sources, the underlying assumptions and the baseline pop-
ulation projections for EU-15, USA and Japan. Then we describe the basic structure of the
simulation model. Since the population projection and the theoretical model structure is iden-
tical for each region/country, we can concentrate on a representative household economy and
omit a region index in the following section. Afterwards, we report the calibration issues for
the simulation model and the baseline transition path.
II. Modelling population dynamics
This chapter discusses our population model. We start with a description of the general model
structure. Then we explain the raw data sources and necessary adjustments in the year 2000.
Section 3 describes the population projections between 2000 and 2050 and section 4 the years
after 2050. Finally some concluding remarks are provided.
1. Basic structure of the model population
Each economy in our model is populated by households who live up to a maximum age of 90.
Consequently, we distinguish up to 91 generations within each period t. The individual life-
cycle of a representative agent is described in Figure 1. Between ages 0 and 20 our households
are children, who earn no money and are fed by their parents. At age 21 our agents leave their
parents and start working. Between ages 23 and 45 our agents have children at the beginning
of each period, i.e. children are age 0 when the parents are 23 and age 20 when the parents
are 43. Between ages 46 and 66 our agents continue to raise their children. The last children
who were born to age 45 parents leave their parents when the latter are age 66. Our agents die
between ages 68 and 90. The probability of death is one at age 91. Consequently, the youngest
5child (born when the parents were 45) of parents who die early at age 68 has already reached
adulthood while the oldest child (born when the parents were 23) of parents who die at age 91
is 68, i.e. parents always outlive grandparents.
Figure 1: The individual life-cycle
-
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Each year new immigrants arrive with their children. After crossing the border, immigrants
become automatically natives in an economic sense, i.e. they have identical wealth endowments,
preferences and life-cycle characteristics as the natives.
The next section describes our data set for the benchmark population in the initial year 2000.
2. Benchmark population in the year 2000
The diﬀerent national and supranational statistical oﬃces provide an enormous amount of
population data. The main raw data for our population model was therefore bought from the
statistical oﬃce of the European Communities (EUROSTAT). Population data for the USA
is provided by the bureau of census (www.census.gov./population/www/), while the data on
Japan was taken from the Statistical Yearbook (www.stat.go.jp/english/) and the Institute of
Population and Social Security Research (www.ipss.go.jp/English/). However, part of the raw
data was only supplied in aggregates. In addition, the speciﬁc structure of our population
model imposed certain restrictions on our data set. Consequently, various adjustments had to
be made in order to arrive at the data set which is reported in the appendix. In the following,
we explain our most important adjustments to the raw data.
Table A-1 reports the existing (native) [N(a,2000)] population structure in the year 2000 in our
three regions/countries. As much as possible, we took the original ﬁgures from the statistical
oﬃces. Our adjustments were mainly twofold. First, the newborns were calculated with the
age-speciﬁc fertility rates explained below. Second, agents who are older than 90 in the original
data were erased and the respective numbers for the ages between 85 and 90 were increased
proportionally. Note that the cohorts in Table A-1 already include the net-immigrants of the
year 2000.
We restrict immigration up to age 65 per deﬁnition mainly for simpliﬁcation reasons, i.e. the
oldest immigrant will at least live for some years before he dies in his new homeland. Detailed
age-speciﬁc net-immigration [NM(a,2000)] data of year 2000 was only available for the USA
and Germany. For EU-15 and Japan the raw data only reports the total net-immigration in
2000. Therefore, in Table A-2 we assumed for EU-15 and Japan identical age structures to
those in Germany.
6Age-speciﬁc birth rates are available for all regions in our sample. However, since it is not possi-
ble to have children before age 23, the children of 15 to 22-year old mothers had to be assigned to
older ones. Table A-3 reports the adjusted numbers of newborns per mother of a certain age in
the year 2000 and our benchmark projection for the year 2050. Note that we do not distinguish
between sexes in the model. Consequently, the fertility rate f(a,i) which denotes the number
of children of an agent of age a in year i is half of the respective number reported in Table A-3.
For the USA detailed fertility projections are available until the year 2100. For Western Eu-
rope, Germany and Japan the United Nations (unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/default.htm
or /ww2000/table2b.htm) provide diﬀerent fertility projections for the whole century. However,
since most of these ﬁgures were highly aggregated, we adjusted our reported birth rates of the
year 2000 in order to approach the aggregate estimates of the raw data for 2050. The resulting
ﬁgures are reported in Table A-3 together with the total fertility rates per woman (TFR) and








Finally, birth rates for the years 2000 until 2050 were computed by linear interpolation.
The ﬁnal component for our population model are region-speciﬁc mortality rates. Again we
took the oﬃcial numbers from the raw data and adjusted them so that they could ﬁt our model
restrictions. As already noted above, agents don’t die in our model before age 68 and don’t
survive age 90. Consequently, the probability of an agent who is age a in year i to die in this





= 0 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 67
> 0 for 68 ≤ a ≤ 90
= 1 for a = 91.
Table A-4 reports these so called “conditional” death probabilities d(a,i) as well as the corre-
sponding “unconditional” death probabilities ¯ d(a,i), i.e. the probabilities of an agent who is
currently at an age below 68, that he will die at a certain age in the future. The unconditional
death probabilities are easier to interpret and to adjust. The latter are computed from1










1An exact calculation would also take into account that the mortality rates change over time. To keep the
conversion simple we assumed constant mortality rates.
7Since disaggregated data on future mortality rates is not provided in oﬃcial statistics, we
adjusted our original year 2000 mortality rates in order to get realistic life expectancies for the
year 2050. Note that our life expectancies at birth are higher than reported in oﬃcial statistics
since the model population can’t die before the age of 68. However, our values come close to
the life expectancies conditional on reaching age 65 in year 2000 reported by the OECD (2003).
Table A-4 reports the mortality rates of the years 2000 and 2050. Again, the numbers of the
period between 2000 and 2050 were ﬁlled by linear interpolation.
The next step is to disaggregate the population in year 2000 according to the structure of the
economic model. Since in the economic model children receive bequests from their parents,
we have to disaggregate each cohort between age 1 and up to age 68 according to the age of
their parents when they were born. This disaggregation was achieved by applying past relative
fertility shares to each cohort of age 1 to 68 in the year 2000. In addition, our population is
split into three income classes so that we get




a = 1,...,67, s = 23,...,45, k = 1,2,3.
For example, the cohort age 1 in year 2000 is disaggregated using the relative fertility rates
of 1999, while the cohort age 40 in 2000 is disaggregated using the relative fertility rates of
1960. In most regions fertility rates have been available since the 50’s. For the older cohorts we
always assumed the latest available data. The parameter Υ(k) is the weight of the income class
k in the total population. Here we assumed that 30 percent of the population belong to the
lowest, 60 percent to the middle and 10 percent to the highest income class. For people older
than 67 we only had to disaggregate the population in year 2000 into these income classes.
We still have to compute the numbers of newborns in year 2000 according to
N(0,2000,s,k) = Υ(k)N(s,2000) × f(s,2000) s = 23,...,45, k = 1,2,3.








which is reported in Table A-1.
This completes our calculations for the year 2000.
3. Population projections until the year 2050
For the years i between 2000 and 2050 population growth is computed endogenously given the
exogenous fertility and mortality rates as well as the future net-immigration pattern and the
population structure for the year 2000.
8Consequently, the cohort age a in year i (of parents age s at time of birth) who belongs to
income class k is simply computed as follows:




Note that we split the vector for net-immigration in year 2000 NM(a,2000) into income classes
by multiplying with the same weight of the income class in total population Υ(k) as the existing
population in year 2000.




N(a,i,s,k) a = 1,...,90
and derive the newborn natives in year i as in year 2000
N(0,i,s,k) = ˆ N(s,i,k) × f(s,i) s = 23,...,45.
Of course, we could add up the newborn cohort across parents ages to derive ˆ N(0,i,k).













and is reported in the tables in subsection 5. The number of children who are fed by a household
at a certain age will be important for his consumption later on. Given age a of an agent in year






23 ≤ a ≤ 65,
where u = max(0;a − 45) and m = min(20,a − 23). Agents below age 23 have no children,
while after age 65 they have all left the household, i.e. KID(a,i,k) = 0 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 22 and
66 ≤ a ≤ 90.
The growth rate of the population n(i) is computed from the change in the number of 21-year
old compared to the previous year, i.e.
n(i) = N(21,i)/N(21,i − 1) − 1.
9Next we turn to the period after the year 2050.
4. Population projections after the year 2050
Between the period 2000 and 2050 we adjust migration as well as the fertility and mortality
rates in order to model a realistic demographic transition. After the year 2050 we keep mortality
constant and adjust migration and the fertility rates in order to run into a stable population
structure in the future. Newborns and net-immigrants in the years after 2050 are consequently
computed as follows:
N(0,i,s,k) = (1 + ¯ n)N(0,i − 1,s,k) s = 23,...,45, k = 1,2,3
NM(a,i,k) = (1 + ¯ n)NM(a,i − 1,k) a = 1,...,65, k = 1,2,3
where ¯ n is the exogenously set population growth rate after the year 2050. It takes exactly 90
years (i.e. until 2140) until we arrive at a constant population structure in the model. Since
we are not so interested in the far future, we just report the population structure for the year
2100 in the following tables where we assume ¯ n = 0.
5. Summary
The following tables show the development of our model population between the years 2000
and 2100. These ﬁgures should be used as a basis for comparison with the oﬃcial projections
of the United Nations Population Division (2003).
10Table 1: Population Projection EU-15
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Life expectancy at birth
Model 82.0 82.7 83.3 83.9 84.5 85.1 85.1
Oﬃciala 78.6 80.0 81.1 82.0 83.0 83.5 –
Fertility Rate
Model 1.44 1.52 1.59 1.66 1.74 1.81 1.82
Oﬃciala 1.58 1.61 1.68 1.77 1.84 1.85 –
Average Birth Age
Model 29.0 29.4 29.7 30.0 30.3 30.5 30.5
Oﬃciala 28.8 29.5 30.1 30.5 30.5 30.5 –
Total Population (in mio.)
Model 376.3 385.7 390.5 390.9 384.4 372.9 340.2
Oﬃcialb 377.3 383.2 384.4 382.8 377.8 369.8 -
Net-immigrants (in 1000) 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Age Structure
< 15 Model 16.9 15.3 14.4 14.2 14.2 14.7 16.4
Oﬃcialb 16.7 15.3 14.4 14.4 14.7 15.0 -
15-64 Model 67.0 66.9 64.7 60.7 57.5 56.8 59.3
Oﬃcialb 66.9 66.5 64.7 60.8 57.5 56.7 -
65-90 Model 16.1 17.8 20.9 25.1 28.3 28.5 24.4
Oﬃcialb 16.3 18.2 21.0 24.7 27.8 28.3 -
a UN Population Division (2003), Western Europe, Medium Variant Projections
b UN Population Division (2003), European Union, Medium Variant Projections
11Table 2: Population Projection USA
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Life expectancy at birth
Model 82.1 82.8 83.5 84.2 84.9 85.6 85.6
Oﬃciala 77.1 78.3 79.1 79.9 81.0 81.6 -
Fertility Rate
Model 2.04 2.06 2.07 2.09 2.10 2.12 1.81
Oﬃciala 2.11 2.08 2.03 1.95 1.89 1.85 -
Average Birth Age
Model 27.3 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.1 27.1 27.1
Oﬃciala 26.6 26.9 27.2 27.4 27.7 27.8 -
Total Population (in mio.)
Model 275.3 306.1 339.7 370.0 395.6 418.5 505.9
Oﬃciala 285.0 314.9 344.3 370.4 391.4 408.7 -
Net-immigrants (in 1000) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Age Structure
< 15 Model 21.3 19.9 19.8 18.9 18.9 19.3 16.4
Oﬃciala 21.8 20.5 20.0 19.3 18.5 17.9 -
15-64 Model 66.1 67.2 63.7 60.3 60.0 59.8 60.6
Oﬃciala 65.9 66.6 64.1 61.5 61.7 62.1 -
65-90 Model 12.6 12.9 16.5 20.7 21.1 20.9 23.0
Oﬃciala 12.3 12.8 15.9 19.2 19.8 20.0 -
a UN Population Division (2003), Medium Variant Projections
12Table 3: Population Projection Japan
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Life expectancy at birth
Model 84.0 84.6 85.2 85.8 86.4 87.1 87.1
Oﬃcial 81.6 83.5 85.1 86.6 87.7 88.1 -
Fertility Rate
Model 1.26 1.36 1.46 1.55 1.65 1.75 1.90
Oﬃciala 1.32 1.37 1.49 1.68 1.81 1.85 -
Average Birth Age
Model 29.1 29.5 29.8 30.1 30.4 30.6 30.6
Oﬃciala 29.3 29.8 30.3 30.5 30.5 30.5 -
Total Population (in mio.)
Model 126.7 128.4 126.2 120.6 112.9 107.0 83.1
Oﬃciala 127.0 128.0 125.6 121.0 115.7 109.7 -
Net-immigrants (in 1000) 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Age Structure
< 15 Model 14.6 13.4 12.5 11.9 12.5 12.9 16.2
Oﬃciala 14.6 13.6 12.4 11.8 12.6 13.0 -
15-64 Model 67.8 64.2 59.5 58.5 55.4 52.6 56.9
Oﬃciala 68.2 64.0 59.5 57.8 53.0 50.4 -
65-90 Model 17.6 22.4 28.0 29.6 32.1 34.5 27.0
Oﬃciala 17.2 22.4 28.1 30.4 34.4 36.5 -
a UN Population Division (2003), Medium Variant Projections
13III. The structure of the economic model
In this section we describe the economic model, which is used for our simulations. We begin
with the household side and describe the decision problems of a representative household. Then
we discuss the aggregation of the micro variables as well as the production side of the economy.
Finally, the tax and transfer system of the multi-region system is explained.
1. The household sector
As already explained above, we do not distinguish between natives and immigrants in the
model. The representative household leaves (unintended) bequests at the date of death due to
imperfect annuitisation. All agents start to make their own economic decisions at the age of
21.
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested CES
utility function. Remaining lifetime utility U(j,t,s,k) of a generation of age j at time t whose
parents were at age s at the time of birth and which belongs to income class k takes on the
form
U(j,t,s,k) = V (j,t,s,k) + H(j,t,s,k), (1)
where V (j,t,s,k) denotes the utility parents receive from their own goods and leisure consump-
tion and H(j,t,s,k) denotes the utility they receive from their children’s consumption. The



































where c(a,i,s,k) and `(a,i,s,k) denote consumption and leisure respectively and i is deﬁned
as i = t + a − j. The children’s consumption of income class k parents who are at age a at
period i and whose parents were at age s at the time of their birth is deﬁned as cK(a,i,s,k).
Note that the number of children is independent of the grandparents’ age when their parents
were born. It varies over the life-cycle and changes in future time periods.





[1 − d(j,j − a + i)], (4)
i.e. by multiplying the conditional survival probabilities from birth up to year i. The para-
meters θ,ρ,α and γ represent respectively the “pure” rate of time preference, the intratemporal
14elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure at each age a, the leisure preference
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of diﬀerent years.
The budget constraint of a 21-year old agent in year t whose parents were age s at his birth




W(a,i,s,k) + I(a,i,s,k) − T(a,i,s,k) − c(a,i,s,k)−
KID(a,i,k)cK(a,i,s,k)

R(i,t) = 0 (5)
where
W(a,i,s,k) = w(i)E(a,k)[h(a,i) − `(a,i,s,k)]
is the gross labor income of the agent and w(i) is the gross wage rate in period i = t + a − 21.
Similarly to Altig et al. (2001) or Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001), we assume that technical progress
causes the time endowment h(·) of each successive generation to grow at the rate λ, i.e.
h(a,i) = (1 + λ)h(a,i − 1). (6)





ξ(1) = 0.2, ξ(2) = 1.0, ξ(3) = 5.0 (7)
is taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 52). This proﬁle is simply shifted by the parameter
ξ(k) in order to derive income class-speciﬁc proﬁles. Moreover, since technological change is
an important determinant of secular growth in real wages during one’s life cycle, we add this
growth by multiplying the age-speciﬁc earnings ability proﬁle with the term involving λ. Hence,
the longitudinal age-wage proﬁle is steepened by the rate of technological change.
The inheritance of an agent who is age a in year i and whose parents are s years older and
who belongs to income class k is denoted by I(a,i,s,k). Before age 68 (i.e. a + s < 68) the
probability of death is zero and consequently there are no bequests. Between age 68 and 90,
a fraction of a parent cohort dies and leaves bequests which are split between their children2.
Therefore, inheritances of their children are deﬁned as follows:
I(a,i,s,k) =
d(a + s) ¯ A(a + s,i,k)
P45
j=23 N(a + s − j,i,j,k)
. (8)
The numerator deﬁnes the aggregate assets of income class k parents who die in year i at age
a + s. The denominator deﬁnes the parent’s total number of children. The inheritances are
2Note that those who die at age 91 leave no bequests. Consequently it’s no problem when their oldest
children die at the same time.
15the reason why we have to disaggregate each cohort according to the age of their parents at
birth. Children, who were born to older parents, receive their inheritances earlier in life, while
children with young parents receive their inheritances later in life. The ﬁrst children of parents
(born when their parents were age 23) receive their inheritances between the ages of 45 and 67.
Those children who were born when their parents were 45 receive their inheritances earlier in
life (between the ages of 23 and 45).
The net-taxes of an agent age a from the income class k in year i consist of consumption,

















p(a,i,s,k) + ¯ τ
h(a,i,s,k) + ¯ τ
d(a,i,s,k)]W(a,i,s,k) − Pen(a,i,s,k). (9)
Note that the heir has to pay capital taxes on the interest income from his inheritance. In
addition, it is also possible to levy inheritance taxes at the tax rate τb(i). Due to a contribution
ceiling, pension, disability insurance and health care contributions may diﬀer across agents.
Pension beneﬁts also depend on the individual income history. On the other hand, health care
and disability transfers are only age- and period-speciﬁc. The tax rates τc, τr and ¯ τw denote
the consumption, capital and (individual) average wage tax rate, while ¯ τp, ¯ τh and ¯ τd deﬁne the
(individual) average pension, health care and disability insurance contribution rate.
Finally, the discount factor with the interest rate r(z) in year z is
R(i,t) =

1 for i = t Qi
z=t+1 [1 + r(z)]
−1 for i > t.
(10)
The asset accumulation of an agent age j in year i whose parents were age s at his birth and
who belongs to income class k follows




(1 + r(i)) + W(j,i,s,k)
− T(j,i,s,k) − c(j,i,s,k) − KID(j,i,k)cK(j,i,s,k). (11)
Given individual consumption, leisure and assets of all agents we can compute the aggregated
variables of a speciﬁc year. Aggregated consumption C(i) and savings A(i + 1) of agents who
























Assets in period i + 1 were saved by the agents who lived in period i. Since households die at
the beginning of each period, we aggregate across all agents who lived in the previous period
in order to compute ¯ A(a+1,i+1,k) which we need for the calculation of the bequests, see (8).










Note the diﬀerence between A(i + 1) and A(i). Consequently, since the former aggregates the
savings of agents who lived in period i, A(i + 1) includes the bequests of those who die at
the beginning of period i + 1 and excludes the assets of the arriving immigrants from period
i+1. The latter aggregates the assets of agents at the beginning of period i. Henceforth, A(i)
excludes the assets of those who have died in the beginning of period i and includes the assets
of the arriving immigrants of period i.
2. The production side
The economy is populated by a large number of competitive ﬁrms. It suﬃces to consider
the planning problem of one representative company and normalize the number of ﬁrms to
unity since they are all assumed to be identical. On the ﬁrm side we model corporate taxes
and assume that all investment is ﬁnanced via retained earnings. However, convex costs of
adjusting the capital stock provide an incentive for smoothing investment.
The analysis of the ﬁrm’s investment decision starts with an arbitrage relationship which states
that in each period i the return on equity, which is composed of the dividend yield DIV (i) and
the capital appreciation V (i + 1) − V (i), equals the return on a comparable ﬁnancial asset:
DIV (i) + V (i + 1) − V (i) = r(i)V (i). (15)
Equation (15) implies that dividends, capital gains and interest income are taxed at the same
(marginal) tax rate. Integrating (15) forward in time and imposing the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
V (T + 1)R(T,t) = 0,
which prevents the ﬁrm’s value from becoming inﬁnite in ﬁnite time yields the valuation of the





17From the cash-ﬂow identity in period i we derive the dividend payments
DIV (i) = (1 − τ
k(i))

Y (i) − w(i)L(i)

− ∆K(i), (16)
which links together dividends DIV (i), proﬁts (i.e. output Y (i) net of wage costs w(i)L(i)),






Y (i) − w(i)L(i)

, (17)
where the corporate tax rate τk(i) is applied to the output net of wage costs.
The ﬁrms marketable output, Y (i), is given by the diﬀerence between gross output and adjust-
ment costs, i.e.
Y (i) = F(K(i),L(i)) − Φ(∆K(i),K(i)) with
FK(i) > 0,FL(i) > 0,Φ∆K(i) ≥ 0,ΦK(i) ≤ 0, (18)
where FK(i) = ∂F




1−1/σ + (1 − ε)L(i)
1−1/σ  1
1−1/σ, (19)
where ε is the parameter measuring the intensity of the use of capital in production, σ is
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production and φ is a technology
parameter. If σ = 1, then the technology is simpliﬁed to the Cobb-Douglas case. The following







The term ψ is the adjustment cost coeﬃcient. Larger values of ψ imply greater marginal cost
of new capital goods for a given rate of investment. The installation technology is linearly
homogeneous and shows an increasing marginal cost of investment (or, symmetrically, disin-
vestment): a faster pace of change requires a greater than proportional rise in adjustment costs
(i.e. Φ∆K(i) > 0).
The objective of the ﬁrm at the beginning of period t is to maximize the ﬁrm value V (t).
Thereby, the ﬁrm has to take into account the ﬁnancial constraint (16), the technology con-
straint (18) and the equation of motion for the stock of capital
K(i + 1) = (1 − δ)K(i) + ∆K(i), (21)
where we assume that capital depreciates at rate δ.
In order to solve this problem, the ﬁrm maximizes the present value Hamiltonian in each period
i ≥ t
H(i) = {DIV (i) + q(i + 1)[∆K(i) − δK(i)]}R(i,t), (22)
18where q(i) is the shadow price which deﬁnes the marginal increase in the ﬁrm value at time i.
That is derived by adding one additional unit of capital to the ﬁrm.
The optimal path requires the following ﬁrst order conditions to be satisﬁed:
∂H(i)
∂L(i)
= 0 => w(i) = FL(i) (23)
∂H(i)
∂∆K(i)
= 0 => q(i + 1) = 1 + (1 − τ








= R(i,t)q(i + 1) − R(i − 1,t)q(i)
=> r(i)q(i) = (1 − τ
k(i))[FK(i) − ΦK(i)] + (1 − δ)q(i + 1) − q(i) (25)
Equations (23) and (24) determine the optimal labor L(i) and investment demand ∆K(i),
respectively. Labor should be employed up to the point where its marginal product equals
the market wage rate. The ﬁrm will invest until the marginal costs of one additional unit of
investment are equal to the marginal beneﬁts from having one additional unit of capital at
the end of period i. The latter is given on the left-hand-side of equation (24) and reﬂects the
marginal increase in the value of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm value for the next period increases due
to the addition of one unit of physical capital valued at the shadow price q(i + 1). Marginal
cash costs on the right-hand-side consist of the marginal cash costs of acquisition plus marginal
costs of installation. Equation (25) is an arbitrage condition which states that the return from
investment in ﬁnancial assets must be equal to the return in shares. The right-hand-side of
(25) is the marginal return to an investor who bought one unit of capital at the price q(i) at
the end of of period i−1. As marginal dividends he receives the net marginal return to capital,
which includes the reduction in current adjustment costs per unit of investment. Furthermore,
the investor realizes a marginal return from the increase in the value of the capital unit which
is net of economic depreciation. The left-hand-side of (25) gives the return if he would have
invested the same amount in ﬁnancial assets.
Finally, as Hayashi (1982) has shown, the marginal value of capital equipment q(i) could be
also used to determine the ﬁrm value according to3
V (i) = q(i)K(i). (26)
3. The government sector
The government sector in the model represents the consolidated budget of the central, state
and local governments as well as the budgets of the pension, health and disability insurance
system.
3A formal proof of this equation in the present context could also be found in Fehr (1999, 54).
193.1. The consolidated government budget
The central government issues new debt ∆B(i) = B(i + 1) − B(i) and collects consumption,
inheritance, capital and wage taxes, social security contributions net of pensions from house-
holds, and corporate taxes T k(i) from companies in order to ﬁnance the public good G(i) and









k(i) = G(i) + r(i)B(i). (27)
With respect to public debt, we assume that the government keeps an exogenously ﬁxed ratio
b(i) of debt to output, i.e.
B(i)
Y (i) = b(i). The public good expenditures G(i) consist of government
purchases of goods and services (including government investments) and education, disability
and health outlays. Expenditures for government purchases are identical per capita, education
outlays are age-speciﬁc and only spent for children and health. Disability outlays are also
age-speciﬁc. Consequently, we have
G(i) = Pop(i)g +
20 X
a=0
N(a,i) × edu(a) + HB(i) + DB(i), (28)
where g are the time invariant per capita outlays of general public goods, edu(a) are the
education outlays per child of age a and HB(i) and DB(i) are aggregate health and disability
outlays, respectively.
The progressivity of the wage tax system is modelled as in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 113).
Individual marginal wage tax rates τw(a,i,s,k) consequently take the form
τ
w(a,i,s,k) = β0 + β1W(a,i,s,k). (29)
This yields an individual average tax rate at the tax base of
¯ τ




Setting β1 = 0 makes the tax system proportional. Increasing β1 while decreasing the value of
β0 in order to keep the revenues constant makes the tax system more progressive.
3.2. The budget of the pension system
We model a PAYGO-pension system in each region. Let’s assume that a k-income class agent
whose parents were s years old at his birth has retired in year z at the exogenously set retirement
age ¯ a(z). Then his pension beneﬁts Pen(a,i,s,k) in year i ≥ z when he is age a ≥ ¯ a(z) depend
on his average indexed earnings during his working time ¯ W(z,s,k):
Pen(a,i,s,k) = χ( ¯ W(z,s,k)) × ¯ W(z,s,k). (31)
20Note that the current age a in year i depends on the retirement year z : a = ¯ a(z) + i − z. The
replacement rate χ is a linear function of the average indexed earnings, i.e.
χ( ¯ W(z,s,k)) = ω0 + ω1 ¯ W(z,s,k), (32)





¯ a(z) − 21
with t = z − ¯ a(z) + a. (33)









The budget of the pension system must be balanced in each period. Therefore, the aggregate
average contribution rate, ˆ τp(i), has to be adjusted to fulﬁll the period budget constraint
ˆ τ
p(i)PY (i) = (1 − µ1(i))PB(i), (35)









min(W(a,i,s,k),Θ ˆ W(i))N(a,i,s,k) (36)












and Θ denotes the contribution ceiling.
Note that we do not allow pensioners to work after retirement in the model. Due to the
contribution ceiling, individual social security tax rates might diﬀer from the aggregate one.
Marginal and average contribution rates of a k income class agent of age a in year i whose




ˆ τp(i) if W(a,i,s,k) ≤ Θ ˆ W(i)





ˆ τp(i) if W(a,i,s,k) ≤ Θ ˆ W(i)
ˆ τp(i)Θ ˆ W(i)/W(a,i,s,k) if W(a,i,s,k) > Θ ˆ W(i).
21The marginal social security tax is zero above the contribution ceiling and the average social
security tax falls with increasing income for an individual.
3.3. The health care system
In the present model we specify an age-speciﬁc lump-sum transfer hc(a) for all agents, which
represents the consumption of health services ﬁnanced by the health care system. The total





Again, since a fraction µ2(i) is ﬁnanced by general taxes, aggregate average health care contri-
bution on wages in year i, ˆ τh(i), is derived from
ˆ τ
h(i)PY (i) = (1 − µ2(i))HB(i). (39)
Due to the contribution ceiling, individual health care contributions might diﬀer from the
aggregate one. Marginal and average contribution rates of a k income class agent of age a in




ˆ τh(i) if W(a,i,s,k) ≤ Θ ˆ W(i)





ˆ τh(i) if W(a,i,s,k) ≤ Θ ˆ W(i)
ˆ τh(i)Θ ˆ W(i)/W(a,i,s,k) if W(a,i,s,k) > Θ ˆ W(i).
3.4. The disability insurance system
Since disability insurance in the EU and Japan is guaranteed by the pension system, the
insurance system in our model is adjusted for the system in the USA. Hence, we specify a
lump-sum transfer di on an equal basis for all agents older than 20 and younger than 65, which
represents the consumption of disability services. These expenses are ﬁnanced by the disability





Similarly to the other two social security systems, aggregate average disability insurance con-
tribution on wages in year i, ˆ τd(i), is derived from
ˆ τ
d(i)PY (i) = DB(i). (41)
22People here also face a contribution ceiling and thus individual disability insurance contributions
diﬀer from the aggregate ones. Marginal and average contribution rates of a k income class




ˆ τd(i) if W(a,i,s,k) ≤ Θ ˆ W(i)





ˆ τd(i) if W(a,i,s,k) ≤ Θ ˆ W(i)
ˆ τd(i)Θ ˆ W(i)/W(a,i,s,k) if W(a,i,s,k) > Θ ˆ W(i).
4. Aggregation and equilibrium conditions
In general equilibrium supply has to equal demand in all markets. We start with the equilibrium
condition on the (national) labor markets which states that labor demand of ﬁrms L(i) in year








E(a,k)[h(a,i) − `(a,i,s,k)]N(a,i,s,k). (42)
Next we aggregate the (individual) budget constraints (11) of the private sector







T(a,i,s,k)N(a,i,s,k) − C(i), (43)
where we have used the deﬁnitions (12), (13), (14) and (42). Substituting the aggregated








T(a,i,s,k)N(a,i,s,k) = ∆B(i) + T
k(i) − G(i) − r(i)B(i), (44)
we arrive at
A(i + 1) − A(i) = r(i)A(i) + w(i)L(i) + ∆B(i) + T
k(i) − G(i) − r(i)B(i) − C(i). (45)
Next we turn to the (national) capital market where (national) savings in period i and the
savings of the immigrants ˆ A entering at the beginning of period i + 1 are equal to the value of
the domestic capital stock, government bonds and net foreign assets Bf in period i + 1, i.e.
A(i + 1) + ˆ A(i + 1) = q(i + 1)K(i + 1) + B(i + 1) + B
f(i + 1). (46)
where







a(a,i + 1,s,k)NM(a,i + 1,k) ×
f(s,i + 1 − a)
TFR(i + 1 − a)
.
23Of course, if we use the deﬁnition of aggregate assets from (14), we would have
A(i) = q(i)K(i) + B(i) + B
f(i). (47)
Next, we substitute (46) and (47) into the consolidated budget constraint of the economy (45)
and apply the deﬁnition (26):
V (i+1)−V (i)+∆B
f(i)− ˆ A(i+1) = r(i)V (i)+r(i)B
f(i)+w(i)L(i)+T
k(i)−G(i)−C(i). (48)
Finally, using the the arbitrage condition (15) and the deﬁnitions (16) and (17) we arrive at
the national goods market equilibrium
Y (i) + ˆ A(i + 1) = C(i) + ∆K(i) + G(i) + TB(i), (49)
where we have substituted ∆Bf(i) = r(i)Bf(i)+TB(i) which simply states that the change in
net foreign assets has to be equal to the net foreign interest payments and the trade balance
TB(i). Note that the left-hand side of this equilibrium condition equals the national income of
the economy.








f(i,x) = 0. (50)
Consequently, in equilibrium aggregate world production and immigrant savings have to be









[C(i,x) + ∆K(i,x) + G(i,x)], (51)
while equilibrium on the world capital market implies that world savings A(i,W) have to equal











This completes the description of the model.
IV. Solving the model
The following ﬁgure gives an overview of the solution method for our simulation model which
we now explain.
24Fix K(2000,x),S(x),r(2000)
Guess K(i,x) i = 2001,...
L(i,x) i = 2000,...
A(2000,x),a(a,2000,s,k)
Get q(i,x) (24)
Get r(i) [US] (25)






Get A(i,x),A(i,W) i = 2001,...
C(i,x),L(i,x) i = 2000,... (12),(13),(14),(42)
Government
Get τc(i,x),...,B(i,x) (27)
e K(i,US) = K(i,US)
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| ˜ K(i,x) − K(i,x)| < 
25Given the capital stock and world interest rate in year 2000 and the asset proﬁles, our model
applies a Gauss-Seidel algorithm to solve for the perfect foresight general equilibrium transition
path of the economy. Our initial guesses for the capital stock for the remaining years of the
transition and for the aggregate labor supply and assets for all transition years are used as
starting points. Next, we compute from equation (24) the path of the unit values for capital in
each region. The path for the world interest rate after year 2000 is derived from the arbitrage
condition (25) for the US. Given the world interest rate and the initial capital stock, we again
use equation (25) in order to compute a path for the capital stock in the EU and Japan.
Condition (25) is also used to update the unit value of the existing capital stock for the year
2000 in each economy. Thereafter, we derive the aggregate initial savings for the year 2000
from the world capital market equilibrium condition (52). We get the aggregated assets in each
region for the initial year by applying region-speciﬁc saving shares S(x) as per cent of the world
assets. We update the level of the asset proﬁle in each region according to these aggregated
assets. Next, the wage rates are computed in each region which are equal to the respective
marginal product of labor. Given initial assets, the time path of tax rates and factor prices,
household decisions on consumption and labor supply are computed and aggregated. Then,
we update the path for tax rates, social security contributions and debt given the government
budget constraints (27), (35), (39) and (41). Finally, we compute a new path for the capital
stock in the US using again the world capital market condition (52). The new values for capital
and labor are then weighted with the initial guess of these supplies to form a new guess of the
time path of these variables. The algorithm then iterates until the path of capital stock and
labor converges. In the model, the transition path to the ﬁnal steady state takes 300 years.
V. Calibration issues
In order to solve our model, we ﬁrst need to specify the preference, technology and policy
parameters to get realistic values for our starting year 2000. Table 4 reports our parameter
values.
The values for the time preference rate, the inter- and intratemporal elasticity of substitution
and the leisure preference parameter are simply taken from Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001). The same
applies to the production side for the elasticity between capital and labor, the capital share in
production, the adjustment cost parameter and technical progress. The technology level is com-
puted to reach a marginal product of labor of one in the steady-state simulation. Throughout
the transition, this value is kept constant.
Next, we specify the policy parameters. The consumption tax rate in the US was chosen in
accordance to Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001), which incorporates a 8.8 percent tax on consumption
expenditures and an additional 2.5 percent tax to account for indirect taxation of labor com-
pensation in the form of pension beneﬁts. In the EU, the indirect tax is simply derived by
the unweighted average of the consumption tax rates in the member states as reported by the
OECD (2001, 16). The Japanese consumption tax rate is also taken from the OECD (2001, 16).
In all regions the capital tax rate is ﬁxed at 20 percent. For the US this value seems reasonable
following Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001, 21f.). The tax rate in Japan is close to realistic values reported
26Table 4: Parameter values of the Model
Preferences and technology Symbol Value
USA EU Japan
Utility function
time preference rate θ 0.02
intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.25
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.4
leisure preference parameter α 1.5
Production function
technology level φ 1.05461
elasticity between capital and labor σ 1.0
capital share in production ε 0.25
adjustment cost parameter ψ 10.0
technical progress λ 0.01
Policy parameters
consumption tax rate (in %) τc 11.3 19.5 5.0
capital tax rate τr 20.0
wage tax parameter β1 0.12 0.09 0.10
debt (in % of NI) B/Y 40.0 50.0 44.0
replacement rate parameters ω0 0.80 0.75 0.75
ω1 -0.335 -0.192 -0.265
age of retirement ¯ a(j) 63 60 60
contribution ceiling Θ 2 2 1.68
capital shares S 0.350 0.484 0.166
by the Ministry of Finance (1999). Assuming a capital tax rate of 20 percent in the EU is
also reasonable if one compares the taxation of interest income from government bonds in EU
countries as presented by Joumard (2001, 30f.). These values range between 12.5 percent and
30 percent. In some EU countries, net-interest income is taxed at the individual’s marginal
income tax rate. However, on average the tax rate should not exceed 20 percent. With regards
to the progressive wage tax, we specify the progressive parameter β1 in each region in order to
get realistic average and marginal tax rates. The proportional term β0 is computed endogenous
to balance the government budget by the wage tax. The resulting average and marginal tax
rates in the US in the initial year of the transition are respectively 4.5 percent and 6.1 percent
in the low income class, 8.1 percent and 13.2 percent in the middle income class and 16 percent
and 29.1 percent in the high income class. The average and marginal wage tax rates in the EU
are respectively 9.8 percent and 11.0 percent in the low income class, 12.6 percent and 16.6
percent in the middle income class and 19.1 percent and 29.5 percent in the high income class.
Compared to the EU, the average and marginal tax rates in Japan take similar values of 9.4
27percent and 10.7 percent, respectively, in the low, 12.4 percent and 16.8 percent in the middle
and 19.4 percent and 30.8 percent in the high income class.
On ﬁrst sight, the government debt as per cent of national income seems to be too low since
the European Commission (2003) reports values of 69.5 percent of national income for the US,
72.8 percent for the EU and 150.4 percent for Japan. However, we tried to get realistic interest
payments of the government also reported by the European Commission (2003). Therefore, we
chose these values for the government debt. In order to get realistic per capita (of children)
education costs, we took the German age-speciﬁc proﬁle for all regions. This proﬁle was rescaled
to yield observed education outlays in 2000. The per capita outlays of general public goods g
were adjusted to get realistic government purchases of goods and services as per cent of national
income for the year 2000 as reported by the European Commission (2003).
Next, we turn to the social security systems. The retirement ages for the US and EU are taken
from Bl¨ ondal and Scarpetta (1999, 53). Since we only model pension beneﬁts that depend on
the labor income received during the individual’s working life, we choose the retirement age
for the earnings-related pension in Japan according to Whitehouse (2002, 24). The progressive
and proportional parameters for the pension replacement rate were calculated to approximately
get the replacement rates relative to individual lifetime earnings as reported by Whitehouse
(2002, 55). However, we had to adjust these values to get realistic aggregated pension beneﬁts.
Due to this calibration, the average replacement rates in 2000 for the low, middle and high
income class in the US are 71.4 percent, 52.7 percent and 18.3 percent, respectively. In Japan
the resulting replacement rates are respectively 69.9 percent, 52.3 percent and 18.5 percent
for the low, middle and high income class which is somewhat less progressive compared to
the US pension system. The replacement rates in the EU are ﬂatter than in the other two
countries. Here, the low, middle and high income class receive 69.9 percent, 58.8 percent and
36.4 percent of their average indexed earnings. The contribution ceiling for Japan is also taken
from Whitehouse (2002). For the US and EU we assume a contribution ceiling of twice the
average indexed earnings as reasonable. As far as health care systems go, we take age-speciﬁc
proﬁles for health care in Japan and Germany (for the EU) which are rescaled in order to yield
realistic health outlays. Disability insurance in these two regions is covered by their pension
systems. Following Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001, 24), the health and disability insurance in the US
only applies to households older and younger than age 65. The health and disability costs are
assumed to be uniform per capita lump-sum transfers.
Our model also requires an initial distribution of assets by age and income class for each region.
These proﬁles are taken from each region’s data.4 We made a linear interpolation of the data
to distribute assets on all ages since these data were only provided as averages for certain age
groups. In addition, these average values for all households had to be distributed among the
diﬀerent income classes. Therefore, the proﬁles were shifted by the same parameter as the
earnings ability proﬁle. We also need to ﬁx the shares S to explain how the aggregate world
4Data on Japanese net worth were provided by Charles Horioka, while the European proﬁles were adjusted
to German data provided by Reinhold Schnabel. US Data were derived from the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances.
28assets are distributed across regions. In order to get these shares, we made a simulation for
all three regions as closed economies and computed the world assets in the initial year 2000.
Then, we calculated each region’s share in the world assets.
Finally, we have to specify the capital stock and the initial interest rate in the starting year
2000 for each region. Here we take the resulting values from an iteration of the model without
adjustment costs.
VI. Initial equilibrium and baseline path
In this section, we report the simulation results for the baseline path of our model. Changing
variables during the transition are only due to the diﬀerent aging processes in the three regions.
Actual policies are held ﬁxed throughout the transition.
1. The initial year 2000
The following table shows the macroeconomic structure in the initial year 2000 of the transition.
For this initial year we tried to replicate a realistic macroeconomic structure and highlight the
diﬀerences in the structure of the public sector. Of course, due to the restrictions of the
theoretical model our data will deviate from reality.
These restrictions already become obvious from the national income shares reported in the
upper part of Table 5. The government shares seem to be too high, but, according to the
deﬁnition of our variable, they include health and, in the case of the US, disability beneﬁts
which are usually reported separately. As soon as the latter are subtracted, the public sector
shares in national income in the US and EU come very close to those reported in European
Commission (2003). However, if one compares the government purchases in Japan in our
model to the realistic values, one can observe a big diﬀerence. The reason is that we set
government purchases in Japan in order to get realistic overall tax revenues of about 20.7
percent of national income in year 2000 as reported in European Commission (2003). Those
government expenditures are ﬁnanced by an exogenously calculated average tax rate of 14.1
percent, which is too high compared to the values reported by OECD (2002b). However, if we
would have set government purchases to 26.6 percent as reported by the European Commission
(2003), this tax rate would have been much higher. During the transition payroll taxes in Japan
rise to more than 50 percent of wage income and also the wage tax rate rises to a value of more
than 20 percent. Therefore, with a higher wage tax rate in the initial year, it was impossible to
get a solution for the transition path so that we concentrated on the tax revenues. One could
argue that the government debt in our model is too low. Hence, wage tax rates are higher than
observed in reality. One has to also keep in mind that interest payments on government debt
in our model would be higher than in reality since the world interest rate is higher than the
observed interest rate in Japan. Due to an increasing interest rate in the baseline path of our
model with constant government debt, the wage tax rate would have to increase much more
than it does now. Thus, even with higher government debt it would be impossible to get a
baseline path for Japan. This should suﬃce to justify our adjustments.
29Table 5: The year 2000 of the baseline path
Model Oﬃcial
USA EU Japan USA EU Japan
National Income
private consumption 77.4 69.4 78.7 77.6 67.8 67.8
government purchases of goods and services 22.8 32.9 22.4 23.0 32.1 33.4
current account 0.2 -1.2 3.1 -4.6 -0.4 3.0
Government indicators
aggregate education outlays 5.9 6.0 4.4 5.9 6.0 4.3
aggregate pension beneﬁts 5.9 11.4 10.8 5.7 11.6 10.8
aggregate health beneﬁts 2.1 6.4 5.2 2.5 6.2 6.8
aggregate disability beneﬁts 1.3 - - 0.9 - -
pension contribution rate (in %) 8.8 16.9 16.5 10.6 - 17.3
health care contribution rate (in %) 2.8 9.6 8.0 2.9 - 8.0
disability insurance contribution rate (in %) 1.9 - - 1.9 - -
Tax revenues 22.3 30.3 20.9 26.6 32.5 20.7
direct taxes 13.6 16.8 17.0 17.9 16.5 10.5
indirect taxes 8.7 13.5 3.9 8.7 16.0 10.2
interest rate (in %) 9.0 -
* in per cent of national income if not stated diﬀerent
The private consumption expenditures in the US and EU are very close to the values reported
in European Commission (2003). The same cannot be said of Japan. The national saving rate
in the US is also very realistic. However, in the EU and Japan they are somewhat smaller than
observed in reality. Next, we turn to the current accounts. In Japan the current account has a
realistic value for the year 2000 whereas the deﬁcit in the EU is somewhat too high compared
to the value in European Commission (2003). In the US, it seems to be highly unrealistic.
However, in our model we consider trade only between our three regions. Trade with China
and South East Asia makes a big contribution to the current account deﬁcit. Hence, the small
surplus in the US is acceptable.
The reported shares in education are very close to the realistic levels reported by the OECD
(2002a). Next, we consider the government insurance systems. For the US we tried to replicate
the payroll tax rates like in Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001) which are very close to the real values.
Therefore, the shares of pension, disability and health beneﬁts are also close to the values
reported by the Social Security Agency (2001) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (2002). In the case of the EU, pension beneﬁts were set in order to reach the values
30reported by the European Commission (2001). The health beneﬁts were set to the average
value for the member states in the EU reported by OECD (2003). The payroll taxes are then
calculated endogenously. The reached contribution rates of 16.9 percent for the pension system
and 9.6 percent for the health care system are reasonable values for the EU. In Japan we set the
contribution rate for the health insurance system to the actual value in 2000. The endogenous
value for the health beneﬁts is lower than reported by the IPSS (2003). Concerning the pension
system we also set ﬁrst the contribution rate to 17.3 percent. However, pension beneﬁts were
much higher than reported by the IPSS (2003) since pension system revenues are used to build
up a capital stock. Since we don’t model this in our simulation model, we tried to get realistic
pension beneﬁts and calculated the contribution rate endogenously.
The reported tax revenues come close to the reported levels as in European Commission (2003)
for all three regions. Even the distribution on direct and indirect taxes is realistic for the US
and EU. In the US the initial average and marginal wage tax rates are 10 percent and 17
percent, respectively, and in the EU 14.2 percent and 19.7 percent, respectively. The values in
both regions are in the range of the reported levels in OECD (2002b). In Japan the revenue of
indirect taxes is very low compared to the oﬃcial level while the wage tax rates are too high
as already discussed above.
Finally, the world interest rate is fairly high. On the other hand, the capital-output ratios are
realistic. With values of 3.2 in the US and EU and 3.3 in Japan, they are very close together
due to the fact that we took the capital stock from a simulation without adjustment costs.
2. The baseline transition path
Next, we turn to the transition path of the baseline simulation (see also Table A-5). As already
mentioned above, the dynamics are solely due to the changing population level and structure
in the three regions. The existing policy in year 2000 is held ﬁx during the transition. Figure
2 shows the dynamics of the social security contribution rates (including pension, health care
and disability insurance) between 2000 and 2100.
As one would expect from the development of the population structure in our three regions (see
Tables 1-3), the strongest increase over the next 50 years will take place in Japan. There the
contribution rates rise from 24.5 percent in 2000 to 50.4 percent in 2050. After the peak of the
aging process, they fall and reach a value of 39.8 percent in 2100 which is still much higher than
in the initial year. In Europe, the payroll taxes increase to a somewhat lower extent than in
Japan from 26.5 percent in year 2000 to a maximum of 45.1 percent in year 2050. This is also
followed by a reduction to 38.7 percent in 2100. The increase of the social security contribution
rates in the US is more modest than in the other two regions since population ageing is not as
strong. Here it increases from 13.5 percent in 2000 to 23.8 percent in 2050. After year 2050,
however, since the aging process in the US takes longer, payroll taxes keep rising but to a lower
extent than in the years before so that they amount to a value of 27.4 percent in the long-run.
The average wage tax rate (see Figure 3) that is computed endogenously shows a strong increase
in the EU from 14.2 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2100. This is due to high government
31Figure 2: Social security contribution rates











. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . USA
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




















. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . Japan
%
expenses per capita and the reduction of the number of active persons. The increase in Japan
is lower since government expenses are less generous. Here the average tax rate rises from 14.1
percent in 2000 to 23.5 percent in 2100. In the US, the development is diﬀerent. While in the
other two regions the wage tax rate increases during the whole transition, it increases in the
US from 10 percent to a maximum of 15.6 percent in 2050. Afterwards, it falls to a long-run
level of 13.3 percent. This is due to the fact that eﬀective labor supply rises strongly after year
2050. Furthermore, government purchases are lower than in the EU which leads to a smaller
increase of the wage tax rate.
Figure 3: Average wage tax rates
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Figures 4 and 5 show the capital stock and labor changes during the next century relative to the
initial year 2000. At ﬁrst, it might seem strange that labor supply in all regions is increasing
until 2100 although the economies are aging. However, one has to keep in mind that the
assumed labor-augmenting technical change raises the time endowments of successive cohorts
by one per cent. Therefore, eﬀective labor supply is rising over time. The highest increase
is in the US where the aging process is not as strong as in the other two regions and where
immigration is higher. Hence, eﬀective labor supply in 2100 is 5.06 times higher than in 2000.
32Japan, however, with an enormous aging population, has the lowest increase in eﬀective labor
supply - it is only 76 percent higher in 2100 compared to the initial year. The development in
the EU falls between the two previously discussed extremes. Here, labor supply is 176 percent
higher in the long-run than in 2000.
Figure 4: Aggregate capital stock (relative
to 2000)
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Figure 5: Aggregate labor supply (relative
to 2000)
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The capital stock, on the other hand, increases in the US while it falls in the EU until 2060
and in Japan until 2070. Afterwards, there is a slight increase of the capital stocks in the EU
and Japan. However, while the long-run capital stock in the US is 2.14 times higher and in
the EU 1.18 times higher compared to the initial year, it is 23 percent lower in Japan than in
2000. During the whole transition the capital-output ratio falls since growth in labor supply
exceeds growth in the capital stock in all three regions. One reason why the capital stock in
the US is not rising as much as the work force and in the EU and Japan even falls during the
ﬁrst part of the transition, is the existence of the social security systems. As seen above, the
contribution rates to these insurance systems rise strongly over the whole period. Even if the
national saving rate rises over the whole period this increase is not high enough to increase the
capital stock as much as the work force in the US due to the rising payroll taxes. In the EU
and Japan the social security systems are more generous and population aging is more severe.
Therefore, contribution rates rise much more than in the US which leads at ﬁrst to a reduction
in the capital stock in both regions. This reduction is strongest in Japan. Another reason is
the increase in the wage tax rates to ﬁnance the government expenses. Since the workers have
less disposable income out of which to save, higher capital accumulation is prevented. However,
we also repeated our simulations for all regions modelled as closed economies. There we found
that the capital stock rises much more in the US and less in the EU and Japan compared to
the here presented open economy case. These diﬀerences are due to capital ﬂows between the
regions which we want to highlight below.
Output growth in all regions is positive despite this development of the capital stocks. In the
US this growth is the strongest so that the national income is more than four times higher in
year 2100 compared to year 2000. The lowest output growth is observed in Japan where the
33national income grows by only 43 percent over the next 100 years. In the EU the long-run
national income is 2.23 times higher than in the initial year.
Of course, the paths of capital and labor determine in turn the paths of wages, capital prices,
current accounts and the interest rate. As shown in Figure 6, wages fall in all three regions
over the whole period. This reduction during the transition is strongest in the US since labor
supply rises stronger than in the other two regions. In the EU and Japan the fall of the wage
rates is slower. However, until the year 2100 the wage rates are reduced by 19 percent in all
regions compared to the initial year.
Figure 6: Wage rates (relative to 2000)
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Figure 7: Prices of capital (relative to 2000)
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The prices of capital (see Figure 7) increase in the US until 2020 and in the EU and Japan
until 2018. They begin to fall when the aging process starts to get severe. In the US, however,
this reduction is the smallest since population aging is more modest compared to the other
two regions where capital prices are reduced strongly. After 2035 the prices rise again. This
increase is more modest in the US since the aging process is slower. In the EU and Japan the
increase is so steep that, starting in 2090, the capital prices are even higher than in the US.
These diﬀerences in the transitional path of the capital prices also inﬂuence capital ﬂows be-
tween our three open economies and hence the development of the current accounts which is
represented in Figure 8. During the ﬁrst years of the transition the initial current current ac-
count deﬁcit in the EU lowers and turns into a surplus with the maximum value in 2025. This
development is due to the fact that capital from the EU is invested in the US where capital
prices rise stronger. That, in turn, makes investments more proﬁtable. At the same time the
initial current account surplus in Japan lowers and becomes a deﬁcit with the maximum value
in 2018. Since the national saving rate in Japan falls, capital invested abroad is shifted back
to Japan where this capital is needed. After 2018 however the saving rate starts to rise so
that capital ﬂows out of the country again since investments in foreign countries lead to higher
returns. In the US the initial current account surplus lightly increases during the ﬁrst years of
the transition. Afterwards, it turns into a deﬁcit which mirrors the capital inﬂows from the EU
and later from Japan since capital prices in the US rise stronger than in the other two regions.
However, when the impact of the aging process in the US starts to grow, the current account
deﬁcit lowers and runs into a surplus again. This indicates capital ﬂows from the US into the
34EU and Japan where capital prices are rising much stronger. The current account is still in
surplus in the long-run while it shows a deﬁcit in the EU and Japan since the aging process
in the US is slower than in the other two regions. In Japan, however, the deﬁcit lowers until
2100. The increase in the national saving rates in the EU and Japan and these strong capital
inﬂows in the long-run leads to the increase in the capital stock observed in the EU after 2050
and in Japan after 2075.
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Finally, the development of the capital prices and the capital stocks will also aﬀect the world
interest rate (see Figure 9). In the ﬁrst years of the transition, the interest rate remains
relatively stable. When population aging in the three regions starts to get severe after 2020
there is a strong increase in the world interest rate until about 2075 where a maximum value
of 13.6 percent is reached. Afterwards, there can be observed a light reduction in the interest
rate so that in 2100 it amounts to a value of 13.5 percent. Overall, there is an increase of 4.5
percentage points over the transition.
Figure 9: World interest rate
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This completes our overview of the baseline path of the most important variables in our simu-
lation model during the demographic transition in the coming 100 years.
35VII. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a new simulation model which allows us to analyze the inter-
action of aging in the three major industrialized world regions. The simulation of a baseline
path, which keeps current policies ﬁxed, shows that the aging process will have a drastic im-
pact on several variables. However, population aging is not identical in all three regions. It is
more profound in Europe and Japan and more modest in the US. Therefore, payroll taxes in
the EU and Japan have to rise much stronger than in the US to balance the budgets of the
social security systems. Due to high fertility rates, high immigration and our assumed technical
progress, labor supply in the US rises stronger during the remaining century than in the other
two world regions. This causes a steady increase in the capital stock in the US. It decreases
in the ﬁrst part of the transition in the EU and Japan. That is followed by an increase in the
long-run. However, due to international capital ﬂows, this increase in the US is smaller and in
the EU and Japan stronger than in a closed-economy simulation. The aging process has also a
strong impact on the world interest rate and the asset prices - both will increase signiﬁcantly.
Furthermore, wage rates will be reduced by 19 percent in the next 100 years. Future living
standards and the welfare of the population are expected to decline due to this reduction and
the high payroll tax burden.
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38Appendix
The following tables in this appendix show our age-speciﬁc distribution of the population and
immigrants for all three regions in the initial year 2000. Age-speciﬁc fertility rates, the total
fertility rates and the average birth ages as well as the mortality rates and life expectancy are
also reported. Furthermore, we report the development of the most important variables during
the transition of our baseline simulation.
39Table A-1: Population in 2000
Age EU-15 USA Japan
0 4.016.593 3.761.366 1.142.303
1 4.039.194 3.778.878 1.157.266
2 4.051.224 3.777.910 1.166.500
3 4.066.273 3.791.496 1.176.192
4 4.091.145 3.817.928 1.185.624
5 4.133.381 3.853.875 1.193.710
6 4.193.783 3.896.863 1.200.809
7 4.264.405 3.949.172 1.208.377
8 4.329.908 4.003.247 1.219.562
9 4.378.894 4.043.429 1.236.451
10 4.406.124 4.048.954 1.260.192
11 4.416.677 4.019.948 1.289.340
12 4.417.558 3.974.382 1.322.759
13 4.419.488 3.938.160 1.359.858
14 4.431.238 3.921.727 1.400.574
15 4.462.448 3.926.118 1.442.117
16 4.514.123 3.944.943 1.478.969
17 4.579.322 3.974.051 1.506.759
18 4.641.379 3.995.603 1.526.957
19 4.689.189 3.987.213 1.545.673
20 4.721.889 3.927.543 1.570.080
21 4.753.609 3.822.257 1.603.192
22 4.800.551 3.697.031 1.646.624
23 4.875.684 3.585.891 1.699.710
24 4.982.191 3.506.686 1.761.550
25 5.117.305 3.470.788 1.824.982
26 5.271.843 3.483.963 1.878.661
27 5.432.383 3.556.493 1.909.253
28 5.584.173 3.668.488 1.911.772
29 5.717.028 3.782.916 1.890.661
30 5.829.740 3.855.559 1.853.426
31 5.926.926 3.889.323 1.805.648
32 6.011.740 3.919.156 1.747.784
33 6.079.295 3.987.070 1.691.846
34 6.116.245 4.095.298 1.647.290
35 6.110.562 4.220.238 1.624.994
36 6.059.583 4.332.891 1.613.056
37 5.973.571 4.429.809 1.604.068
38 5.867.285 4.508.320 1.590.006
39 5.751.939 4.565.710 1.577.142
40 5.634.489 4.584.069 1.566.772
41 5.519.027 4.563.689 1.561.130
42 5.410.227 4.511.872 1.562.278
43 5.310.361 4.441.307 1.576.303
44 5.220.873 4.349.265 1.607.117
45 5.144.848 4.234.100 1.655.019
40Table A-1 continued
Age EU-15 USA Japan
46 5.086.603 4.102.250 1.718.945
47 5.052.213 3.975.331 1.801.920
48 5.040.041 3.864.726 1.905.994
49 5.041.768 3.775.251 2.026.142
50 5.030.727 3.690.008 2.132.587
51 4.977.221 3.596.330 2.182.303
52 4.856.614 3.465.435 2.135.068
53 4.684.995 3.298.697 2.006.290
54 4.501.262 3.107.546 1.855.759
55 4.355.660 2.938.442 1.758.895
56 4.265.669 2.797.866 1.734.933
57 4.229.966 2.680.483 1.749.554
58 4.225.800 2.555.162 1.749.776
59 4.228.373 2.428.899 1.712.295
60 4.210.118 2.311.363 1.654.335
61 4.159.013 2.219.608 1.603.561
62 4.080.647 2.149.356 1.577.449
63 3.989.944 2.094.575 1.565.785
64 3.894.977 2.044.047 1.551.739
65 3.801.749 1.993.197 1.524.076
66 3.716.696 1.943.001 1.487.647
67 3.649.538 1.903.196 1.449.515
68 3.594.243 1.878.473 1.411.086
69 3.537.256 1.865.520 1.368.102
70 3.461.704 1.851.226 1.318.476
71 3.367.831 1.825.583 1.264.430
72 3.261.258 1.785.638 1.208.199
73 3.150.596 1.735.595 1.148.572
74 3.037.631 1.682.030 1.082.242
75 2.924.761 1.628.546 1.008.431
76 2.807.758 1.575.363 931.508
77 2.670.597 1.517.209 857.154
78 2.483.318 1.446.491 789.219
79 2.231.694 1.358.134 725.173
80 1.939.208 1.255.088 663.794
81 1.668.439 1.147.799 604.525
82 1.474.081 1.045.571 552.270
83 1.368.957 951.405 507.137
84 1.317.013 862.388 467.387
85 1.269.226 776.295 427.465
86 1.187.566 693.506 385.530
87 1.052.546 615.878 341.719
88 849.985 544.112 298.142
89 578.461 477.310 255.824
90 259.817 413.313 214.655
P
376.339.250 275.262.239 126.715.967
41Table A-2: Immigration in 2000
Age EU-15 USA Japan
0 0 0 0
1 4.476 14.584 537
2 3.105 12.722 373
3 1.058 11.131 127
4 762 10.337 91
5 1.497 12.246 180
6 359 11.782 43
7 178 12.849 21
8 2.903 13.302 348
9 3.421 13.828 410
10 4.163 16.603 500
11 5.191 17.545 623
12 5.915 19.263 710
13 7.115 20.867 854
14 7.343 22.925 881
15 9.135 24.338 1.096
16 12.191 26.711 1.463
17 13.683 30.267 1.642
18 18.035 35.677 2.164
19 29.034 34.615 3.484
20 36.799 35.896 4.416
21 31.825 20.377 3.819
22 34.941 22.482 4.193
23 33.028 24.041 3.963
24 29.895 29.085 3.587
25 23.901 31.842 2.868
26 17.586 32.395 2.110
27 14.609 29.957 1.753
28 11.550 27.991 1.386
29 9.048 26.094 1.086
30 6.271 25.327 753
31 3.917 24.962 470
32 2.135 21.876 256
33 1.538 20.716 185
34 1.551 19.030 186
35 1.349 17.108 162
36 1.962 16.328 235
37 1.801 14.675 216
38 2.401 13.528 288
39 2.966 12.303 356
40 3.369 12.160 404
41 3.769 10.967 452
42 3.514 11.092 422
43 3.969 9.828 476
44 2.977 8.283 357
45 3.607 9.039 433
42Table A-2 continued
Age EU-15 USA Japan
46 3.492 8.018 419
47 2.952 8.266 354
48 3.253 7.182 390
49 3.341 6.722 401
50 2.916 6.715 350
51 1.965 5.484 236
52 1.612 5.161 193
53 1.370 5.205 164
54 444 5.341 53
55 550 5.322 66
56 095 5.169 11
57 470 5.178 56
58 807 5.186 97
59 2.032 5.091 244
60 32 5.102 4
61 635 4.565 76
62 1.216 4.849 146
63 1.545 4.404 185
64 859 4.225 103
65 574 3.841 69
P
450.000 1.000.000 54.000
43Table A-3: Age-speciﬁc fertility rates
Woman EU-15 USA Japan
Age 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050
23 0.1102 0.0173 0.3597 0.3750 0.0683 0.0119
24 0.1166 0.0702 0.3284 0.3429 0.0631 0.0465
25 0.1214 0.1259 0.2663 0.2790 0.0778 0.0818
26 0.1239 0.1489 0.2048 0.2157 0.1076 0.1038
27 0.1248 0.1535 0.1439 0.1531 0.1375 0.1312
28 0.1241 0.1557 0.1131 0.1215 0.1565 0.1681
29 0.1204 0.1556 0.1113 0.1196 0.1498 0.1975
30 0.1130 0.1525 0.1073 0.1154 0.1240 0.2046
31 0.1021 0.1455 0.0744 0.0816 0.0940 0.1858
32 0.0888 0.1342 0.0645 0.0715 0.0639 0.1504
33 0.0744 0.1194 0.0531 0.0598 0.0457 0.1115
34 0.0600 0.1024 0.0424 0.0487 0.0441 0.0810
35 0.0461 0.0845 0.0328 0.0338 0.0406 0.0649
36 0.0346 0.0671 0.0225 0.0180 0.0307 0.0573
37 0.0260 0.0515 0.0346 0.0304 0.0210 0.0484
38 0.0192 0.0388 0.0261 0.0217 0.0127 0.0362
39 0.0137 0.0289 0.0196 0.0151 0.0078 0.0242
40 0.0094 0.0211 0.0139 0.0092 0.0057 0.0153
41 0.0061 0.0149 0.0093 0.0044 0.0044 0.0101
42 0.0037 0.0101 0.0058 0.0008 0.0031 0.0072
43 0.0021 0.0065 0.0033 0.0000 0.0019 0.0053
44 0.0011 0.0039 0.0018 0.0000 0.0009 0.0036
45 0.0004 0.0022 0.0009 0.0009 0.0003 0.0021
TFR 1.4422 1.8109 2.0397 2.1183 1.2613 1.7487
ABA 29.01 30.5 27.28 27.07 29.11 30.6
TFR=Total fertility rate (female), ABA=Average birth age
44Table A-4: Mortality rates
EU-15 USA
Age 2000 2050 2000 2050
¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·)
. . . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
68 0.023 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.026 0.026 0.002 0.002
69 0.024 0.025 0.004 0.004 0.028 0.028 0.003 0.003
70 0.026 0.027 0.005 0.005 0.029 0.030 0.005 0.005
71 0.027 0.029 0.007 0.007 0.030 0.033 0.006 0.006
72 0.029 0.032 0.009 0.009 0.032 0.036 0.007 0.007
73 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.012 0.033 0.038 0.009 0.009
74 0.033 0.039 0.015 0.016 0.034 0.042 0.012 0.012
75 0.035 0.043 0.020 0.022 0.035 0.045 0.016 0.017
76 0.036 0.047 0.026 0.028 0.036 0.048 0.022 0.023
77 0.038 0.051 0.030 0.034 0.037 0.052 0.027 0.029
78 0.039 0.056 0.034 0.039 0.038 0.055 0.032 0.036
79 0.040 0.061 0.036 0.043 0.038 0.059 0.035 0.041
80 0.041 0.067 0.038 0.048 0.038 0.063 0.038 0.046
81 0.042 0.073 0.040 0.053 0.038 0.067 0.040 0.050
82 0.042 0.079 0.042 0.058 0.038 0.071 0.041 0.055
83 0.042 0.084 0.044 0.064 0.037 0.075 0.042 0.060
84 0.041 0.090 0.045 0.071 0.036 0.079 0.043 0.065
85 0.039 0.094 0.047 0.079 0.034 0.080 0.044 0.071
86 0.037 0.098 0.048 0.088 0.029 0.076 0.045 0.077
87 0.033 0.099 0.049 0.098 0.022 0.062 0.045 0.084
88 0.027 0.088 0.049 0.110 0.014 0.041 0.045 0.093
89 0.016 0.059 0.050 0.124 0.007 0.021 0.045 0.102
90 0.007 0.026 0.049 0.141 0.003 0.009 0.045 0.112
91 0.002 1.000 0.048 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.044 1.000
LE 82.05 85.13 82.06 85.63




¯ d(·) d(·) ¯ d(·) d(·)
. . . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
68 0.013 0.013 0.001 0.001
69 0.014 0.014 0.001 0.001
70 0.015 0.016 0.001 0.001
71 0.017 0.018 0.002 0.002
72 0.018 0.020 0.002 0.002
73 0.020 0.021 0.002 0.002
74 0.021 0.023 0.002 0.002
75 0.023 0.026 0.002 0.002
76 0.025 0.029 0.002 0.002
77 0.027 0.033 0.002 0.002
78 0.029 0.036 0.003 0.003
79 0.031 0.039 0.003 0.003
80 0.034 0.046 0.003 0.003
81 0.039 0.055 0.004 0.004
82 0.043 0.064 0.025 0.026
83 0.045 0.072 0.046 0.049
84 0.047 0.080 0.068 0.075
85 0.047 0.088 0.089 0.107
86 0.047 0.095 0.110 0.148
87 0.045 0.102 0.131 0.207
88 0.043 0.107 0.152 0.303
89 0.040 0.111 0.131 0.374
90 0.043 0.136 0.110 0.501
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